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I. Ethical Challenges in a Changing Profession 
In little more than four decades,2 the field of American legal ethics has been transformed 
from an unimportant backwater into a mighty river of legal principles that drives the practice of 
law in countless respects.  Today, this complex matrix of substantive provisions and enforcement 
mechanisms ensures, to a great extent, that clients are protected from unnecessary harm, that 
lawyers are safeguarded from improper accusations,3 and that the provision of legal services is 
consistent with the public interest. 
However, the fabric of legal ethics is threatened by a looming transformation of the legal 
profession.4  That potential restructuring may revolutionize the delivery of legal services by 
replacing what is essentially a unified5 American legal profession that has monopoly powers and 
corresponding responsibilities with a diverse range of legal services providers, some of whom 
may not be lawyers at all,6 others of whom may not be fully licensed,7 and none of whom will 
enjoy an exclusive franchise.  Such changes, if they come to pass, will undercut the foundations 
upon which the law of modern legal ethics is founded.  It will then be necessary to reconstitute 
an effective legal ethics regime for a world of disaggregated legal services. 
A. Basic Assumptions and Established Practices 
The current model of American legal ethics is animated by three important assumptions, 
each of which is now under attack.  The first is that legal services are ordinarily provided only by 
fully licensed lawyers.8  The second is that lawyers are members of an exclusive profession9 
                                                          
2
 See Part II. 
3
 For example, the legal malpractice principles under the law of negligence protect lawyers from liability based on 
the reasonable exercise of judgment.  A lawyer cannot be held liable merely because some other lawyer would have 
charted a different course in dealing with complex facts or uncertain legal principles.  A lawyer may be found to be 
negligent only if the lawyer did what no reasonable lawyer could have done or failed to do what every reasonable 
lawyer was obliged to do.  See Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Tex. 1989) (“If an attorney makes a 
decision which a reasonably prudent attorney could make in the same or similar circumstance, it is not an act of 
negligence even if the result is undesirable.”). 
4
 See Part III. 
5
 The legal profession in other parts of the world is different.  See Steven Alan Childress, Lawyers, in 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 930, 934 (David S. Clark, ed. 2007) 
(“Many countries do not share any broad and unifying conception of the legal profession or do not have a clear and 
formal definition of legal practice as does the United States.”). 
6
 See Thomas D. Morgan, Professional Malpractice in A World of Amateurs, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 891, 892-94 
(2009) (arguing that the “increase in nonlawyer delivery of what have traditionally been seen as legal services . . . is 
a trend that . . . is destined only to accelerate” and providing examples). 
7
 See Debra Cassens Weiss, In Washington State, “Legal Technicians” Will Be Allowed to Help Civil Litigants, 
A.B.A. J., Jun. 19, 2012 (“Washington State’s top court has approved a new rule [effective September 1, 2012] 
allowing licensed legal technicians to help civil litigants navigate the court system”). 
8
 One indication that the legal profession’s monopoly over the provision of legal services is being challenged is the 
difficulty that the organized bar encounters in attempting to enforce provisions against the unauthorized practice of 
law. See, e.g., Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956, 956 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(vacating an injunction against the sale of Quicken Family Lawyer software because, after the trial court ruled, the 
Texas legislature passed a statute “providing that ‘the “practice of law” does not include the design, creation, 
publication, distribution, display, or sale ... [of] computer software, or similar products if the products clearly and 
conspicuously state that the products are not a substitute for the advice of an attorney’”); see also THOMAS D. 
MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 77-78 (2010) (“When the State Bar of Texas tried to enjoin 
accounting firm Arthur Andersen from providing what were arguably legal services, . . . the Bar ultimately had to 
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which is subject to special obligations both to clients and the public.10  And the third is that entry 
into the legal profession requires extensive educational preparation during which all new lawyers 
are introduced to fundamentals, including the rules of professional responsibility. 
Today, all lawyers in any American jurisdictions must comply with a mandatory ethics 
code,11 which regulates both on-the-job and off-the-job conduct.12  With limited immunities,13 
those same lawyers are also subject to malpractice liability under basic legal standards,14 such as 
the principles of negligence15 and fiduciary duty.16  There are other enforcement mechanisms 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
give up for lack of funds.”); Jonathan J. Bates, Say No to High Court Endorsement of Pro Se Forms, TEX. LAWYER, 
Aug. 6, 2012 (arguing that “the Texas Supreme Court should not give its imprimatur to legal forms for pro se 
litigants). 
9
 See MORGAN, supra note 7, at 20 (asserting that the “use of the idea of a ‘profession’ to understand the world of 
lawyers obstructs clear thinking about what lawyers actually do and how they are likely to have to respond to the 
world they face”); id. at 21 (“lawyers in America are not now a profession and—over most of their history—they 
never have been one”); id. at 55-56 (“the American view of law as a profession is at most a little more than a century 
old and, more realistically, a project of the 1950s and 1980s”).  But see Neil Hamilton, The Profession and 
Professionalism Are Dead?: A Review of Thomas Morgan, the Vanishing American Lawyer (2010), 20 PROF. LAW. 
14, 14 (2010) (challenging the idea that that the concepts of “profession” and “professionalism” are dead, even 
though “we could do a great deal better in realizing them”). 
10
 See Eli Wald, Loyalty in Limbo: The Peculiar Case of Attorneys’ Loyalty to Clients, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 909, 966 
(2009) (arguing that “what lawyers do is a ‘limited agency,’ which requires serving constituencies other than clients 
and striking a balance between loyalty to clients and loyalties to the legal system and the public.”). 
11
 See Business Organizations—Professions, Rules of Professional Responsibility (Statutes), 
https://a.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/Blob/Iaa42991f5ae711de9b8c850332338889.pdf?targetType=surveys-
stat-
pdf&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentImage&contextData=(sc.Histor
y*oc.Search) (last visited July 18, 2012) (offering a detailed fifty-one jurisdiction compilation). 
12
 See Margaret Raymond, Professional Responsibility for the Pro Se Attorney, 1 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALP. & 
ETHICS 1, 6 (2011) (“Professional responsibility rules can effectively be divided into two categories: rules that apply 
to lawyers when they are acting in the role of lawyer, and rules that apply to all lawyers at all times, regardless of 
whether those lawyers are engaged in the practice of law.”). 
13
 For example, lawyers who represent criminal defendants are largely immunized from malpractice liability by the 
rule that requires a convicted client to prove exoneration or innocence as a condition to suing for malpractice.  See 
Vincent R. Johnson, The Unlawful Conduct Defense in Legal Malpractice, 77 UMKC L. REV. 43, 63-69 (2008). 
In virtually all states, lawyers enjoy absolute immunity for communications that are made in the regular 
course of judicial proceedings.  Cf. Bochetto v. Bigson, 860 A. 2d 67, 72-73 (Pa. 2004) (holding that the publication 
of material in an allegedly defamatory complaint filed with a trial court was absolutely privileged, but that the faxing 
of a copy of the complaint to a news reporter was only potentially qualifiedly privileged). 
In some jurisdictions, public defenders are often protected from malpractice liability by some form of 
absolute or qualified statutory immunity.  See, e.g., Osborne v. Goodlet, No. M2003-03118-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 
1713868, *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 22, 2005) (finding that a public defender was absolutely immune under a state 
statute which provided that “[s]tate officers and employees are absolutely immune from liability for acts or 
omissions within the scope of the officers or employee’s office or employment, except for willful, malicious, or 
criminal acts or omissions or for acts or omissions done for personal gain” and under another statute which provided 
that “[n]o court in this state has any power, jurisdiction or authority to entertain any suit against . . . any public 
defender . . . for any act of negligence”); see also Powell v. Wood Cnty. Comm’n, 550 S.E.2d 617, 620-21 (W. Va. 
2001) (holding that a statute conferring immunity on court-appointed criminal defense counsel logically required a 
county to indemnify appointed counsel with respect to costs incurred in defending against a malpractice claim). 
14
 But see Leigh Jones, Survey Maps Malpractice Law from Sea to Shining Sea, NAT’L L.J., July 13, 2012 (“All 
states recognize a claim of legal malpractice as a claim sounding in tort, contract or both — except Alabama. In 
Alabama, a claim for legal malpractice exists only under statute, the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act.”). 
15
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 48 (2000) (discussing professional negligence). 
16
 See, e.g., Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Tex. 2002) (“Our courts have long 
recognized that certain fiduciary duties are owed by . . . an attorney to a client.”).  See generally RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 37 (2000) (discussing breach of fiduciary duty). 
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such as fee forfeiture,17 civil sanctions,18 criminal penalties,19 and exacting judicial scrutiny of 
lawyer-client contracts20 and transactions.21  It is nevertheless indisputable that professional 
discipline and malpractice lawsuits form the essential backbone of modern legal ethics.    
If the practice of law fragments and the now-unified profession is replaced by diverse 
specialized legal callings, it will be difficult or impossible for discipline and malpractice to play 
the same critical role in guiding the conduct of, and holding accountable, the persons who serve 
clients as legal advisors and learned intermediaries.  This is true because in a less unified 
professional world it will be more difficult to frame an appropriate standard of care for 
malpractice actions, less likely that there will be comprehensively developed ethics codes for 
each variety of practice, and harder to insist that the practice of law is a fiduciary, rather than a 
market-place, endeavor.22  
B. Professional Accountability and Regulatory Effectiveness 
The basic architecture of American legal ethics is now so well established, so firmly in 
place,23 that is difficult to consider that the entire structure may be in jeopardy.  Moreover, it is 
hard to doubt the durability of the current legal ethics regime because the relevant rules and 
                                                          
17
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 37 (2000) (discussing fee forfeiture based on 
“clear and serious violation of duty” to a client).  But see Jeffrey A. Webb & Blake Stribling, Ten Years After 
Burrow v. Arce, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 967, 972 (2009) (“[F]orfeiture, while sought with increasing regularity in recent 
years, has not actually been awarded in the vast majority of those instances.”). 
18
 See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 431-32 (8th ed. 2009) 
(discussing the dramatic increase in judicial sanctions of lawyers over the past three decades because of the 1983 
implementation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.); see also Stephen D. Brody & David K. 
Roberts, The Ethical Difficulties of Court-Ordered Inspections of Social Networking Accounts, 225 PLI/NY 249, 
263 (2012) (discussing a Virginia case where an attorney and his client were sanctioned for intentionally deleting 
damaging Facebook photographs that the opposing party had requested); Lester v. Allied Concrete Co., 80 Va. Cir. 
454 (2010) (ordering monetary sanctions). 
19
 See Chad Bray, Ex-NY Lawyer Pleads Guilty In Client Theft, WALL ST. J. BLOG (May 3, 2012, 5:38 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/05/03/ex-ny-lawyer-pleads-guilty-in-client-theft/ (discussing a guilty pleas arising 
from theft of nearly $140,000 from long-time clients). 
20
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 18 (2000) (discussing client-lawyer contracts);  
see also James M. “Jamie” Parker, Jr. & J.K. Leonard, Why Your Secretary Is Really Worth a Million Dollars: 
Exploring the Harsh Penalty for Not Proofreading Your Fee Agreements in Anglo-Dutch Petroleum v. Greenberg 
Peden, 2 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALP. & ETHICS 104, 132 (2012) (discussing whether, in the context of lawyer 
fee agreements, the requirement of “reasonable clarity actually means something closer to strict liability”). 
21
 See, e.g., Liggett v. Young, 877 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 2007) (holding that business transactions with clients that are 
not standard commercial dealings are presumptively fraudulent); McMahon v. Eke-Nweke, 503 F. Supp. 2d 598 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying summary judgment to a lawyer, in a client’s breach of a fiduciary duty action, because 
there was a question of fact as to whether the client had been informed of all material circumstances related to the 
lease of space by the client to the lawyer); see also Vincent R. Johnson, “Absolute and Perfect Candor” to Clients, 
34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 737, 772 (2003) (indicating that business transaction between a lawyer and client “will not 
survive scrutiny unless the lawyer proves that the highest standards of disclosure and fair dealing were observed.”). 
22
 See Part IV-B. 
23
 For example, there are no less than twenty textbooks on attorney professional responsibility currently published 
by the five major law book presses (Aspen, Carolina Academic Press, Foundation Press, LexisNexis, and West).  
While some authors uniquely define the relevant substantive material (see, e.g., DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, R. 
MICHAEL CASSIDY, & JUDITH A. MCMORROW, LAWYERS AND FUNDAMENTAL MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (2nd ed. 
2010) (focusing on moral development and virtue)), the topics covered in most textbooks suggest that there is an 
established “canon” that defines what constitutes the law of professional responsibility (which includes, among a 
host of widely shared topics, conflicts of interest, confidentiality, competence, client perjury, and attorney disclosure 
obligations). 
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processes seem to work reasonably well, probably better than at any point in American history,24 
and often better than in other countries.25   
Today, in the United States, errant lawyers routinely are held accountable for their 
misconduct.26  Aggrieved clients have a fair chance at compensation via actions for damages or 
restitution,27 if they have meritorious claims.28  Moreover, the legal system generally operates 
honestly and in accordance with established legal principles.  Judicial decisions are usually based 
on legitimate factors aired in adversarial settings, not on personal relationships,29 bribes,30 secret 
communications,31 or political manipulation.32  The public expects lawyers33 and judges34 who 
                                                          
24
 Cf. David Gialanella, Technology Credited With Hike in Disposition of Ethics Cases, N.J. L.J., July 6, 2012 (“The 
[New Jersey] Disciplinary Review Board adjudicated and docketed more cases in 2011 than it had in any year since 
the mid-2000s, thanks largely to increased technological efficiency.”). 
25
 See, e.g., Katarina Lewinbuk, Perestroika or Just Perfunctory? The Scope and Significance of Russia's New Legal 
Ethics Laws, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 25, 77-79 (2010) (discussing obstacles to an effective legal ethics regime in Russia); 
William P. Alford, Of Lawyers Lost and Found: Searching for Legal Professionalism in the People’s Republic of 
China, in RAISING THE BAR: THE EMERGING LEGAL PROFESSION IN EAST ASIA 287, 292-93 (William P. Alford ed. 
2007) (discussing widespread corruption of legal processes in China and noting that “the expansion of the Chinese 
bar has been accomplished by increasing corruption, with lawyers at times a conduit for, if not the instigators of, 
such behavior”). 
26
 See Debra Moss Curtis, Attorney Discipline Nationwide: A Comparative Analysis of Process and Statistics, 35 J. 
LEG. PROF. 209 (2011) (offering detailed state-by-state statistical information for the years 1998 through 2008 on 
grievances filed, resulting formal charges, and discipline imposed); see also State Bar of Texas Commission for 
Lawyer Discipline, Annual Report: June 1, 2010 – May 31, 2011 (2011), available at 
http://www.texasbar.com/Content/NavigationMenu/ForLawyers/GrievanceInfoandEthicsHelpline/CDC-
AnnualReport.pdf (last visited July 16, 2012) (gathering statistics on lawyer discipline in Texas). 
27
 The completion of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2011) seems certain to 
invigorate thinking about remedies for lawyer misconduct.  “Restitution is a remedy which measures the plaintiff’s 
entitlement to redress based not on what the plaintiff lost (damages), but on what the defendant improperly gained.”  
VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 260 (2011). 
28
 Of course, the obstacles to proving that one has a meritorious malpractice action are formidable, including the 
difficult “trial-within-a-trial” causation requirement.  See Suder v. Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, LLP, 992 A.2d 413, 
420 (Md. 2010) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 cmt. b (2000), which 
provides that “[a]ll the issues that would have been litigated in the previous action are litigated between the plaintiff 
and the plaintiff’s former lawyer, with the latter taking the place and bearing the burdens that properly would have 
fallen on the defendant in the original action.”); see also Leigh Jones, Survey Maps Malpractice Law from Sea to 
Shining Sea, NAT’L L.J., July 13, 2012 (quoting the editor of A 50-State Survey of Legal Malpractice Law, published 
by the American Bar Association, as stating that “in virtually every state, the element of causation is determined by 
the case-within-a-case test . . . . While Louisiana employs that test, the burden is placed on the attorney to prove that 
the plaintiff would not have prevailed. It seemingly shifts the burden to the attorney to disprove causation.”); Jeffrie 
D. Boysen, Comment, Shifting the Burden of Proof on Causation in Legal Malpractice Actions, 1 ST. MARY’S J. 
LEGAL MALP. & ETHICS 308, 311 (2011) (discussing a “significant minority of jurisdictions” that allow the burden 
of proof on causation to shift under some circumstances). 
29
 See Vincent R. Johnson, America’s Preoccupation with Ethics in Government, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 717, 720-23 
(1999) (contrasting American practices with the Chinese tradition of using “guanxi”—gifts and special 
relationships—to influence official decisions); see also In re Hill, 8 S.W.3d 578, 2000 WL 19451 (Mo. 2000) 
(suspending a judge who should have recused himself from a case involving daughter of a mayor, with whom judge 
had a dispute); Matter of Eplin, 416 S.E.2d 248, (W. Va.1992) (suspending a judge who accorded special treatment 
to a criminal defendant in order to gain the favor of an elected official); Mary Pat Gallagher, Judge Who Helped 
Girlfriend in Legal Case Denies Wrongdoing, N.J. L.J., June 25, 2012 (describing ethics charges against a judge). 
30
 But see Assoc. Press, More Judicial Corruption Emerges, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 2, 2012, at A12 
(“A dozen people, half lawyers, have been indicted as part of a federal probe into what some observers call the most 
wide spread case of judicial corruption they’ve ever seen.”). 
31
 See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9 (2012) (prohibiting ex parte communications); In re Henriksen, C.J. Nos. 
1 & 2, 2011, 2012 WL 1672242 (Del. May 3, 2012) (upholding removal of a judge based in part on improper ex 
parte communications); In re Cotton, 939 N.E.2d 619, 623 (Ind. 2010) (suspending an attorney who made an 
improper ex parte communication and engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); see also 
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fall short of the standards of conduct to be held accountable,35 and typically those expectations 
are not disappointed. 36 
C. New Realities 
 The question then is this: what happens to American legal ethics if the foundational 
assumptions change?  How will clients be protected, and how will the administration of justice 
operate legitimately, if legal services are not only provided by lawyers, if legal services providers 
are not treated as members of the profession, or if the practice of law is not preceded by 
extensive professional education?  Can anything replace disciplinary and malpractice actions as 
vehicles for deterring bad practices and holding malefactors accountable?   
This article examines the options for restructuring legal ethics if the American legal 
profession changes in fundamental ways that make it difficult or impossible for negligence and 
fiduciary-duty malpractice principles and legal ethics codes to play the same important roles they 
currently perform.37  Part II briefly discusses the recent history and current state of American 
legal ethics.  Part III considers why and how the American legal profession may fundamentally 
change in the near future, with particular reference to Professor Thomas D. Morgan’s recent 
book, The Vanishing American Lawyer.38  Part IV evaluates the main nonprofessional option for 
regulating the conduct of legal services providers who are either not fully licensed or not lawyers 
at all, namely the legal principles governing contracts.  Part V offers concluding thoughts about 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Vincent R. Johnson, Corruption in Education, A Global Legal Problem, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 34-35 (2008) 
(discussing the dangers posed by ex parte communications in academic contexts). 
32
 But see Justice in Jeopardy, 2003 REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE 21ST 
CENTURY JUDICIARY, at 31-36, available at  
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/judind/jeopardy/pdf/report.authcheckdam.pdf (describing “a 
number of recent episodes in which altercations between the political branches and their respective judiciaries have 
culminated in threats to the judiciary's budget or jurisdiction or in other proposals to exert greater control over the 
judiciary as an institution”).  For a comparative perspective, see Vincent Robert Johnson, The French Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and Citizens of 1789, the Reign of Terror, and the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris, 13 BOSTON 
COLL. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 22-24 (1989) (describing how the abuses perpetrated by the Revolutionary Tribunal 
of Paris during the French Revolution were caused in part by political interference with the performance of judicial 
duties). 
33
 See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Longino, 945 N.E.2d 1040 (Ohio 2011) (ordering disbarment of an attorney for 
misappropriating settlement funds, forging signatures, and supplying false information). 
34
 See, e.g., Mary Pat Gallagher, Discipline Sought for Judge Who Acquitted Acquaintance on Ticket, N.J. L.J., July 
12, 2012 (reporting that a former municipal judge faced “censure and banishment from the bench for allegedly 
fixing a traffic ticket for his daughter's ex-teacher”). 
35
 See David Gialanella, N.J. Attorney Ethics Complaints Keep on Rising, N.J. L.J., July 31, 2012 (discussing recent 
statistics); see alsoVincent R. Johnson, America’s Preoccupation with Ethics in Government, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 
717, 724 (1999) (“Americans today expect that the law can, should, and will be used to ensure that a level playing 
field in public life exists by eliminating, insofar as possible, any unfair advantage that might be gained through the 
use of special connections to those who exercise the power of government.”). 
36
 See, e.g., R. Robin McDonald, Judge Parrott Retires When JQC Launches Ethics Probe, DAILY REPORT, May 22, 
2012 (discussing alleged abuse of the prestige of judicial office); Embattled N. Georgia Magistrate Resigns, DAILY 
REPORT, Aug. 17, 2012 (discussing a judge’s resignation following an investigation into whether he distributed pre-
signed, blank arrest and search warrants to police officers); see also The Hot Seat: Lawyers and Judges in Trouble, 
www.law.com (July 18, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202561519667&slreturn=20120620151747 
(collecting numerous news stories about allegedly unethical conduct by lawyers and judges). 
37
 See generally Vincent R. Johnson, The Virtues and Limits of Codes in Legal Ethics, 14 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS 
& PUB. POL’Y 25, 29-40 (2000) (discussing how legal ethics codes protect clients, foster equality of treatment, 
promote ethical discourse, perform an important declarative function, and facilitate re-examination of ethical 
choices). 
38
 MORGAN, supra note 7. 
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whether those principles, together with laws against deception (tort actions for fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation and deceptive trade practices laws), can effectively ensure that 
diverse legal services providers act in a manner consistent with the best interests of clients and 
the proper administration of justice. 
II. The Rise and Reach of the Current Regime 
A. The Clark Report and Watergate   
It is important to remember that the modern American legal ethics is a relatively recent 
invention, not even fifty years old.39  The revolution began in earnest with the work of an 
American Bar Association committee chaired by former Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark.40  
In 1970, that committee declared that lawyer disciplinary processes were scandalously deficient 
and required immediate attention.41  Followed soon by the Watergate Crisis, which exposed 
widespread lawyer wrongdoing at the highest levels of government,42 the Clark Report catalyzed 
a professional restructuring that is still underway.43  Thirty years into that process, the reform 
efforts reached a plateau with the American Law Institute’s promulgation of the Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.44  That work of professional scholarship left no doubt 
about the importance of legal ethics as an area of contemporary American law.  
B. The Legal Ethics Revolution 
Today, with the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to see how thoroughly the field of legal 
ethics was transformed during the past half century.  In vivid contrast to the era that ended in 
                                                          
39
 Of course, the roots of American legal ethics go much deeper.  See DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 
(1836); GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW 
(1854); see also MICHAEL S. ARIENS, LONE STAR LAW: A LEGAL HISTORY OF TEXAS 184-87 (2011) (discussing the 
development of ethical standards in Texas); Michael S. Ariens, Legal Ethics in an Age of Anxiety, 40 ST. MARY’S 
L.J. 343, 349-451 (2008) (discussing American legal ethics from the 1800’s to early twenty-first century); Carol 
Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385, 1454 (2004) 
(“The basic elements of the medieval provisions—fairness in litigation, competence, loyalty, confidentiality, 
reasonable fees, and public service—continue to be the central principles of modern legal ethics.”); Thomas L. 
Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Jr., “Technical” Defenses: Ethics, Morals, and the Lawyer as Friend, 14 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 337, 340-45 (2007) (discussing Hoffman and Sharswood).  However, until recent times, attorney standards of 
conduct were never broadly enforced through a wide range of legal sanctions, including those imposed by 
professional discipline and legal malpractice actions.  
40
 See Vincent R. Johnson, Justice Tom C. Clark’s Legacy in the Field of Legal Ethics, 29 J. LEGAL. PROF. 33, 35 
(2005) (“The Report was the starting point in a revolution which, over ensuing decades, has wholly reshaped the 
field of legal ethics.”); see also MIMI CLARK GRONLUND, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE TOM C. CLARK:  A LIFE OF 
SERVICE 249-51 (2009) (discussing the work of the Clark Committee). 
41
 See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 1 (Final Draft 1970) (“After three years of studying lawyer discipline throughout 
the country, this Committee must report the existence of a scandalous situation that requires the immediate attention 
of the profession.”). 
42
 See Kathleen Clark, Legacy of Watergate for Legal Ethics Instruction, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 673, 673 (2000) (quoting 
former White House counsel John Dean as stating, “[H]ow in God's name could so many lawyers get involved in 
something like this?”). 
43
 See Mark Curriden, The Lawyers of Watergate, ABA J., June 2012, at 36, 42 (quoting John Dean as stating, 
“When I took the elective course in ethics at law school, it was one-quarter of a credit.  Legal ethics and 
professionalism played almost no role in any lawyer’s mind, including mine.  Watergate changed that—for me and 
every other lawyer.”). 
44
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000). 
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1970, attorney professional responsibility is now the subject of required law school courses, 45 
bar examinations,46 academic specialization,47 continuing education programs,48 burgeoning 
literature,49 advisory resources,50 professional associations,51 widespread news coverage,52 
                                                          
45
 See Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Ethics In Legal Education, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 43 (2009) (indicating that to 
restore public confidence in the legal profession in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, in 1974, the American 
Bar Association (ABA) mandated that accredited schools “require for all students . . . instruction in the duties and 
responsibilities of the legal profession . . . . [Currently almost] all schools require courses in professional 
responsibility.”). 
46
 Cf. Andrew M. Perlman, Margaret Raymond, & Laurel S. Terry, A Survey of Professional Responsibility Courses 
at American Law Schools in 2009 (2009), available at http://www.legalethicsforum.com/files/pr-survey-results-
final.pdf (indicating that 66.3% of 105 respondents teaching at 77 law schools taught a course in professional 
responsibility at least once each academic year and that “the vast majority of respondents regularly teach 
professional responsibility.”). 
47
 See National Conference of Bar Examiners, The MPRE, http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mpre/ (last visited 
July 17, 2012) (“The MPRE is required for admission to the bars of all but four U.S. jurisdictions.”); see also Paul 
T. Hayden, Putting Ethics to the (National Standardized) Test: Tracing the Origins of the MPRE, 71 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1299 (2003) (“In the span of two decades, we have thus seen the flowering of a remarkable phenomenon: the 
establishment of a national bar examination on legal ethics in a country in which the states purportedly control bar 
admission.”). 
48
 See LAW. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 21:3004 (2010) (“All of the mandatory continuing legal 
education jurisdictions earmark at least one hour each year for ethics education. Some jurisdictions consider ethics 
and professionalism to be interchangeable; some impose a separate professional requirement."); see also STEPHEN 
GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 687 (8th ed. 2009) (indicating that “more than 
40 American jurisdictions have mandatory continuing legal education (CLE) requirements . . . [and that most] 
jurisdictions require that two or three of these hours be in legal ethics.”). 
49
 For example, some law journals now focus on issues of lawyer professional responsibility. These include the 
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, the University of Alabama’s Journal of the Legal Profession, and the St. 
Mary’s Journal on Legal Malpractice and Ethics.  Other law journals frequently publish articles on legal ethics 
topics.  See Martha Pagliari, Recent Scholarship, in AALS Professional Responsibility Section Newsletter, at 33-37 
(Spring 2012) (listing more than 70 articles published between January 1 and May 4, 2012); see also Robert M. 
Jarvis, Book Review, J. LEGAL. PROF. 111, 112 (2008) (noting that “the library of legal malpractice materials has 
expanded at a rapid rate during the past three decades”). 
50
 Lawyer magazines, such as the ABA Journal, often contain a monthly ethics column. In addition, some lawyer 
publications, such as National Law Journal, law.com, New Jersey Law Journal, and Texas Lawyer, devote 
considerable coverage to ethics issues, such as disputes between lawyers and clients, law firm breakups, and court 
rulings related to the practice of law.   
In many states, lawyers can obtain free advice by phone about ethical issues that arise in the practice of 
law. For example, in Texas, a lawyer can call a toll-free number and talk to a professional who specializes in 
answering questions related to the disciplinary rules. See State Bar of Texas, Toll Free Attorney Ethics Helpline, 
available at 
http://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Grievance_Info_and_Ethics_Helpline&Template=/CM/HTM
LDisplay.cfm&ContentID=15697#toll (last visited July 16, 2012) (discussing the service).  
The American Bar Association offers a free service called ETHICSearch. See American Bar Assoc., 
ETHICSearch, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/services/ethicsearch.html (last visited July 16, 
2012).  Available to lawyers and legal support personnel, ETHICSearch helps users promptly locate citations to 
relevant ABA rules, advisory ethics opinions, and other resources, usually without a cost. 
51
 The American Bar Association’s Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers (APRL) operates an active 
listserv and regularly holds continuing education conferences that draw attendees representing all segments of the 
professional responsibility bar and academia.  See Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers,  
http://www.aprl.net/ (last visited July 9, 2012).  The National Organization of Bar Counsel (NOBC) is a professional 
organization of lawyers who investigate and prosecute grievances against lawyers.  See National Organization of 
Bar Counsel, http://www.nobc.org/ (last visited July 9, 2012).  See generally, American Bar Association Center for 
Professional Responsibility, Overview, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/professionalism/professionalism_codes.ht
ml (last visited July 11, 2012) (providing links to prominent legal organizations that have adopted professionalism 
standards, creeds, codes, and policies). 
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malpractice litigation,53 and vigorous professional discipline.54  Moreover, in the wake of 
expanded civil liability for lawyers, “malpractice insurance companies became some of the most 
important reviewers and regulators of lawyer conduct.”55 
Professional ethical prescriptions which were once merely aspirational principles for 
good professional deportment have been transformed into legally enforceable obligations.56  
Today, errant lawyers are regularly held liable for misconduct in actions seeking damages, 
disqualification, civil sanctions, fee forfeiture, and professional discipline.  Moreover, the 
principles of American legal ethics reign not just at home but, in some cases, abroad.  The 
American model of legal ethics is routinely exported around the world57 by a host of Rule of 
Law initiatives.58  For example, the American Bar Association conducts legal and judicial ethics 
training in places as far flung as Mongolia, Moldova, Indonesia, and Morocco.59  Yet, while the 
rise and the reach of American legal ethics are undeniable, so are the signals that there may be 
trouble ahead.  
III. The Gathering Storm in the Legal Profession and Legal 
Education 
A. The Tipping Point 
There is abundant evidence that the American legal profession (and with it, American 
legal education) is at a tipping point, which, if passed, may result in a significant re-configuration 
of how, and by whom, legal services are delivered.  The portents are everywhere.60  On the one 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
52
 See, e.g., Big-Time Lawyer Who's Imprisoned For Keeping A Teen Sex Slave Suspended From Practice, BUS. 
INSIDER, July 12, 2012, 2012 WLNR 14021409 (discussing a New York lawyer who worked in Moscow, Russia); 
John Sullivan, In New Jersey, Rogue Lawyers Are on the Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2003, at 4 (“To many, the 
words legal and ethics fit together like an elephant in a bikini, but state courts take attorney discipline 
seriously.”); Duff Wilson, Prosecutor in Duke Case Disbarred by Ethics Panel, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 17, 2007), 
www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/us/17duke.html (discussing the necessity of disbarment). 
53
  See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS:  2004-2007 (2008) (offering a 
statistical analysis of legal malpractice claims). 
54
 See, e.g., Donald R. Lundberg, Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard: An Appreciation, Reminiscence and 
Retrospective,  RES GESTAE, January/February 2012, at 17 (discussing 27 years of lawyer discipline in Indiana under 
Chief Justice Shepard). 
55
 See MORGAN, supra note 7, at 79. 
56
 See Vincent R. Johnson, America’s Preoccupation with Ethics in Government, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 717, 746-48 
(1999) (asserting that during the twentieth century the professional ethics of lawyers, judges, politicians, and civil 
servants shifted from being “largely personal matters,” where individuals “relied primarily upon religious beliefs 
and social mores,” to a very different situation where rules of conduct are “routinely codified in uniform terms and 
strictly enforced”). 
57
 See James E. Moliterno, Exporting American Legal Ethics, 43 AKRON L. REV. 769, 769 (2010) (“Over the past 
decade or so, a massive exportation of U.S. lawyer ethics law, primarily to emerging democracies, has been taking 
place.”). 
58
 Cf. Vincent R. Johnson, The Rule of Law and Enforcement of Chinese Tort Law, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 43, 45-
46 (2012) (noting that today “volunteers in nongovernmental programs, such as those conducted by the American 
Bar Association, the Open Society Institute, and the Salzburg-based Center for International Legal Studies, fan out 
across the globe to build the Rule of Law.”). 
59
 See ABA Rule of Law Initiative, http://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of_law.html (last visited July 9, 
2012) (discussing programs in foreign countries). 
60
 See Karen Sloan, One More Task Force on the Legal Profession’s Problems, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 8, 2012) 
(describing an American Bar Association task force to examine changes “roiling the law profession and legal 
education”); Lauren K. Robel, American Association of Law Schools Presidential Address 2012, AALS News (Feb. 
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hand, many persons believe that American law schools are graduating too many new lawyers61 at 
too high a price62 with degrees leading to too few jobs.63  On the other hand, practicing lawyers, 
including nascent ones laboring under mountains of student loan debt,64 must compete not only 
with the endless supply of American lawyers65 and other professionals (e.g., accountants66 and 
real estate brokers67), but with various entities (e.g., software companies68 and outsourcing 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2012), at 1, 1 (reporting that nine of the top ten law school news stories of 2011 “were arrayed along a fairly narrow 
spectrum from dreadful to horrible: breaches of data integrity; calls for Congressional hearings about law school 
debt or graduate unemployment; declining applications; high and rising law school costs; lawsuits by graduates; and 
claims that legal academics . . . neglect to teach their students how to practice law”). 
61
 See Lincoln Caplan, Editorial, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012 (opining that 
“law schools . . . have been churning out more graduates than the economy can employ”); see also MORGAN, supra 
note 7, at 80 (“Over the past thirty-five years, the American bar has grown more rapidly . . . than in any comparable-
length period in history.”).  But see Carole Silver, Book Review, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 691, 691 (2012) (noting that 
“[c]ritics charge that law school is too expensive, that the three years required to earn the typical J.D. degree is too 
long, and that law schools are admitting too many students,” but arguing that, viewed from outside the U.S., 
American legal education is a model for reform). 
62
 See Karen Sloan, Law School—Still a Dodgy Investment, Analysis Suggests, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 3, 2012 (quoting 
Vanderbilt University law professor Herwig Schlunk as stating that today “[l]aw school is a very risk (and 
expensive) investment”); Karen Sloan, Think Law School’s Expensive? You Don’t Know the Half of It, NAT’L L.J., 
May 2, 2012 (detailing projections of student loan debt); Karen Sloan, It Gets Worse — Organization 
Underestimated Law School Debt, NAT’L L.J., May 4, 2012 (discussing law schools that “low-balled the cost-of-
living figures”). 
63
 See Karen Sloan, ABA: Only 55 Percent of Law Grads Found Full-Time Law Jobs, NAT’L L.J., June 18, 2012 
(“Slightly more than half of the class of 2011 — 55 percent — found full-time, long-term jobs that require bar 
passage nine months after they graduated.”); see also Karen Sloan, A Dismal Job Market for Law Grads, NAT’L L.J., 
June 7, 2012 (“Employment rates for the law school class of 2011 hit an 18-year low.”); Ashby Jones, New Lawyers, 
Seeking Jobs, Are Advised to Think Small, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2012 (noting that jobs “have been hard for law 
graduates to land in recent years due to a nationwide glut of lawyers and a slump in the legal industry since the 2008 
financial crisis.”);  David Gialanella, U.S. Law School Applications Fall as Legal Job Opportunities Seen Waning, 
N.J. L.J., Apr. 10, 2012 (quoting Wendy Margolis of the Law School Admissions Council as suggesting that the 
weak legal “job market and economy help explain the downtrend in law school applications”); cf. David Gialanella, 
Uncertainty Leads More Firms to Abandon Summer Programs, N.J. L.J., May 25, 2012 (discussing firms electing to 
jettison summer associate positions). 
 The slow down in the American legal job market is similar to problems in other countries.  Even in China, 
“college graduates are having trouble finding jobs.”  Beijing Model Under Stress, China Lacks a Way to Turn 
Discontent into Mandate for Reform, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2012. 
64
 See David Segal, For 2nd Year, a Sharp Drop in Law School Entrance Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2012 (noting 
the “spreading view that the legal market in the United States is in terrible shape” and observing that “many new 
lawyers are struggling with immense debt”).  “American students are now more than $1 trillion in debt for their 
[undergraduate and graduate] studies.”  Alan G. Walker, Keeping Tuition in Reach, READ. UNIV. BUS., June 13, 
2012. 
65
 See Lincoln Caplan, Editorial, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012 (“In 2009, twice 
as many people passed bar exams as there were legal openings.”).  Cf. Karen Sloan, Starting Salaries Continue to 
Slide as Big Firm Opportunities Dry Up, NAT’L L.J., July 12, 2012 (reporting a “dramatic three-year decline in 
starting salaries for recent law graduates”). 
66
 See Elijah D. Farrell, Note, Accounting Firms and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Who Is the Bar Really 
Trying to Protect?, 33 IND. L. REV. 599, 602 (2000) (“[S]ome in the legal profession insist that in many cases their 
accounting firm counterparts are already practicing law.”); see also Katherine D. Black & Stephen T. Black, A 
National Tax Bar: An End to the Attorney-Accountant Tax Turf War, 36 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 17-23 (2004) (evaluating 
precedent holding that preparation of tax returns does not constitute the practice of law). 
67
 See ARIZ. CONST. art. 26, § 1 (1962) (“Any person holding a valid license as a real estate broker or a real estate 
salesman regularly issued by the Arizona State Real Estate Department when acting in such capacity as broker or 
salesman for the parties, or agent for one of the parties to a sale, exchange, or trade, or the renting and leasing of 
property, shall have the right to draft or fill out and complete, without charge, any and all instruments incident 
thereto.”). 
68
 See Standard Legal, http://www.standardlegal.com/ (last visited July 9, 2012) (offering do-it-yourself legal 
forms). 
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providers69) who offer law-related products or products, both in the United States and abroad.70  
At the same time, ever-faster modes of communication and the trend toward globalization are 
increasing and transforming the demands of clients and, as a result, the way that law is 
practiced.71  As the business of law metamorphosizes, lawyers face unprecedented challenges,72 
such as how to comply with professional obligations when client tasks are outsourced to India 
and other parts of the globe,73 when confidential information is stored in the “cloud,”74 when 
building a law practice is done through social networking,75 when even firms without a media 
presence must have social media policies,76 or when relegated to performing only a limited range 
of tasks77 for a client in a world of “unbundled” legal services.78  Adding to these challenges, 
“much of the information lawyers have traditionally sold is now freely available on the 
Internet.”79 
                                                          
69
 Foreign outsourcing providers supply law-related services (e.g., legal document drafting and litigation assistance) 
and general office support (e.g., billing and document management).  See generally Pangea3, 
http://www.pangea3.com/ (last visited July 20, 2012) (offering the services of Indian, U.S. and U.K. attorneys and 
scientists and claiming to be the “most experienced provider of high-quality legal outsourcing solutions to Fortune 
1000 companies and Am Law 200 law firms”). 
70
 See MORGAN, supra note 7, at 86-87 (explaining how globalization multiplies competitive pressure on lawyers 
and clients). 
71
 Cf. James Podgers, Come the Evolution, ABA J., July 2012, at 26 (discussing proposals to revise professional 
conduct rules to account for impact of the recent technology revolution and globalization on law practice). 
72
 See Joe Dysart, A Discovery, ABA J., July 2012, at 32 (speculating that failure to stay current on e-discovery 
technology “may soon be considered an ethical violation”). 
73
 See generally Vincent R. Johnson & Stephen C. Loomis, United States, in 33a COMPARATIVE LAW YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, “OUTSOURCING LEGAL SERVICES: IMPACT ON NATIONAL LAW PRACTICES” 283 (2012) 
(discussing the ethical issues related to the outsourcing of legal work from the United States). 
74
 Cf. Catherine Dunn, Why Companies Should Know Where in the World Cloud Data Are Stored, CORP. COUNSEL, 
June 12, 2012 (noting privacy and human rights implications).  See generally DAVID THOMSON, LAW SCHOOL 2.0: 
LEGAL EDUCATION FOR A DIGITAL AGE (2008) (describing the challenges and opportunities for legal education 
created by modern technology). 
75
 See Kathleen Elliott Vinson, The Blurred Boundaries of Social Networking in the Legal Field: Just "Face" It, 41 
U. MEM. L. REV. 355, 389-98 (2010) (discussing social networking by practitioners and related ethical issues); see 
also Craig Estlinbaum, Social Networking and Judicial Ethics, 2 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALP. & ETHICS 1, 28 
(2012) (“Because the canons [of judicial ethics] are imprecise and subject to fact-based applications post hoc, judges 
must use extraordinary caution and judgment before participating in an online community.”). 
76
 See Kenneth L. Hardison, Avoid Social Media Pitfalls, TRIAL, July 2012, at 28, 34 (outlining key directives “for 
both postings on the firm’s social media sites and employees’ personal postings that could be attributed to the 
firm”); see also John G. Browning, Digging for the Digital Dirt: Discovery and Use of Evidence from Social Media 
Sites, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 465, 476-78 (2011) (discussing pertinent ethics opinions). 
77
 See MORGAN, supra note 7, at 157 (“While firms will prefer to have clients employ several of its practice groups 
at once to deal with a matter, firms are likely to find themselves offering partial or ‘unbundled’ services as an 
alternative to traditional legal representation.”); id. at 158 (“Unbundling is likely to seem unsettling to lawyers who 
formerly did a job from start to finish, but unbundled services will take maximum advantage of the lawyer 
specialization that seems likely to be inevitable.”). 
78
 See Michele N. Struffolino, Taking Limited Representation to the Limits: The Efficacy of Using Unbundled Legal 
Services in Domestic-Relations Matters Involving Litigation, 2 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALP. & ETHICS 166, 188-89 
(2012).  As Professor Struffolino explains:  “The tasks [in legal representation] typically include: “(1) gathering 
facts, (2) advising the client, (3) discovering facts of the opposing party, (4) researching the law, (5) drafting 
correspondence and documents, (6) negotiating, and (7) representing the client in court . . . . Unbundling can be 
either horizontal or vertical.  Horizontal unbundling includes limiting the representation to tasks necessary to 
accomplish one objective in the pending matter, such as obtaining child support. Vertical unbundling occurs when 
the attorney is retained to perform only one or more tasks from the bundle, such as offering advice or drafting a 
pleading.”). 
79
 MORGAN, supra note 7, at 95. 
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Clients forced to match the low prices of international competitors in a “flattened” 
world80 are forcing law firms to reduce the costs of legal services.81  The comfortable salaries of 
transactional lawyers, particularly those in elite law firms, are an appealing target for business 
clients fixed on cutting expenses.82  Developments in the Far East may hold lessons for the West.  
The cost-cutting pressures faced by American law firms practicing in Asia have made it “very, 
very hard for firms to make money in the region.”83 
In the recent recession, it became increasingly necessary for large law firms to sue their 
clients to collect their fees.84  Until lately, that extreme step was usually avoided at all costs for 
fear of triggering a retaliatory legal malpractice claim.85  However, many law firms have 
concluded that such risks must be incurred to deal with recalcitrant clients who are unwilling to 
pay.86 
It is not fanciful to ask whether lucrative and seemingly secure portions of the American 
legal profession could vanish.  That has happened in other fields.87  In recent decades, the once 
vibrant Main Streets of American cities and towns were rendered obsolete by the advent of 
shopping centers, malls, and discount stores.88  Highly paid industrial workers saw their jobs 
                                                          
80
 See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT:  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 6–7 (2005) 
(arguing that “the word is flat” in the sense that, in selling goods and services, businesses must compete with 
counterparts in other countries).   
81
 See Alan Cohen, Six Big Law Firms Get Serious About Legal Project Management, N.J. L.J., Aug. 8, 2012 
(discussing how clients push firms for efficiency and cost predictability). 
82
 See Shannon Green, Crunching Law Department Numbers to Reduce Outside Counsel Spending, CORP. COUNSEL, 
June 15, 2012 (discussing a program that broadly implemented flat fees in lieu of hourly fees); “Entry” Fee, ABA 
J., July 2012, at 33 (“Since the recession, in-house counsel have been increasingly reluctant to pay fees for entry-
level associates.”). 
83
 Anthony Lin, Still Hungry, THE ASIAN LAWYER, May 1, 2012 (“M&A deals are . . . usually competitively bid and 
handled on flat fees far lower than comparable billables on a stateside deal.”). 
84
 See John Council, Bonus Time? Former Client Alleges He Never Signed Contract to Pay Performance Incentive 
Bonus, TEX. LAW., Apr. 11, 2012 (discussing a law firm’s claims for breach of contract, fraud, and fraudulent 
inducement); John Council, BAM! Counsel Win $21 Million in Fees From Clients Who Wouldn’t Pay, TEX. LAW., 
Jan. 30, 2012, at 1 (discussing litigation involving “lawyers who did a fantastic job for a client and a client who 
didn’t want to pay and alleged everything in the book to get out of paying”); Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Texas Firms 
File Suits to Pursue Legal Fees, TEX. LAW., Sept. 12, 2011 (discussing several lawsuits to collect fees); Lynne 
Marek, Chicago Firm Sues Client Over $747,500 in Fees, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 21, 2010 (opining that “every firm has its 
limits” when it comes to nonpayment of fees); see also Former Lawyer for Detroit Mayor Claims Unpaid Fees, 
NAT’L L.J., Aug. 28, 2008 (discussing a lawsuit to collect fees). 
85
 Cf. Andrew Longstreth, Ex-Debevoise Client Raises Nasty Counterclaims in Unpaid Bills Case, AMLAW LITIG. 
DAILY, Jan. 13, 2010 (discussing a malpractice counterclaim seeking $55 million in damages that was filed in 
response to a claim for $6 million in unpaid legal bills). 
86
 Cf. Ben Present, Judge Criticizes Woman Who Tried to Avoid Attorney Fees, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 12, 
2012 (referring to “a strongly worded opinion in favor of a Northeastern Pennsylvania plaintiffs attorney whose 
clients . . . tried to avoid paying his contingency fee on a $4.6 million settlement by, among other things, filing a 
complaint with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and threatening to call the police”). 
87
 Cf. Jeff Selingo, Fixing College, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2012 (stating that “information industries, from journalism 
to music to book publishing, . . . have been transformed by technology, resulting in the decline of the middleman — 
newspapers, record stores, bookstores and publishers”). 
88
 See Peter L. Kilborn, Another Tumble in the Decline of Main Street, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 1993), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/04/us/another-tumble-in-the-decline-of-main-
street.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm ("[A]long most Main Streets, grand old names . . . and scores of one-of-a-kind 
speciality shops are long gone, either dead or flown to the shopping centers."). But see Jonathan O’Connel, Main 
Street Making a Comeback at the Expense of the Shopping Mall, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/main-street-making-a-comeback-at-the-expense-of-the-
shopping-mall/2011/11/18/gIQAfnEhfN_story.html (contrasting the recent lack of development of new shopping 
centers with a resurgence of interest in “[o]utdoor town center concepts . . . evoking the Main Streets of yore”). 
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shipped overseas, as the country’s manufacturing base was decimated. 89  The once-mighty 
American railroads, at least in the passenger sphere, disappeared in most places or became living 
anachronisms.90  A corporation no less than Eastman Kodak, an erstwhile American icon, 
plummeted faster and farther than anyone could have imagined.91  All this occurred in just a few 
short decades.  
No one who follows current events can doubt that, in terms of economics, the world is 
now highly interconnected and that developments on one side of the globe can have 
consequences on the other.92  Moreover, there is no reason to think that the American legal 
profession is any more immune to the tides of economic change than lawyers in other countries, 
such as England, where there have recently been radical changes.93 
Some law schools have already begun to downsize.  Certain “experts say that the planned 
reductions by at least 10 of the roughly 200 laws schools accredited in the U.S. suggest a new 
reality is sinking in: The legal profession may never return to its prerecession prosperity.”94 
Legal education and the legal profession may be experiencing what amounts to a “big structural 
shift.”95  According to Dean Frank Wu of the University of California Hastings College of Law, 
“This is Detroit in the 1970s: change or die.”96 
The Supreme Court of Washington recently adopted a “Limited Practice Rule for Limited 
License Legal Technicians.”97  The Rule permits persons with training as a paralegal or legal 
assistant, who have experience working under the supervision of a lawyer, to become licensed as 
a legal technician to perform certain tasks for clients.98  Those tasks include a limited, albeit 
broad, range of services, such as obtaining relevant facts, informing the client of applicable 
procedures and deadlines, providing the client with self-help materials, reviewing and explaining 
documents and exhibits, selecting and advising the client about forms, performing legal research 
                                                          
89
 See PETER HESSLER, COUNTRY DRIVING: A JOURNEY THROUGH CHINA FROM FARM TO FACTORY 60 (2010) 
(describing how an automobile factory was moved from Pennsylvania to China). 
90
 See generally Billy Colorado, Disappearing Railroad Blues, DAILY KOS (Jan 30, 2011), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/01/30/939949/-Disappearing-Railroad-Blues (discussing the decline of the 
American railroad). 
91
 See Simon Waldman, Kodak: Why the Moment Has Passed, GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jan/19/kodak-why-moment-has-passed (noting that Kodak has filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy after "teeter[ing] on the brink of collapse for the best part of a decade").  
92
 Of course, the idea that that the world is economically interconnected is not new.  During the Taiping Uprising in 
Qing Dynasty China (1851-64), “Britain’s neutrality in the U.S. Civil War came at the expense of abandoning it in 
China.”  STEPHEN R. PLATT, AUTUMN IN THE HEAVENLY KINGDOM:  CHINA, THE WEST, AND THE EPIC STORY OF THE 
TAIPING CIVIL WAR 16 (2012).  This was taken as “evidence that the empire at the end of the world was now 
connected to the economic and political systems of the West.”  Id. at 31.  “Karl Marx, in 1853, a London 
correspondent for the New-York Daily Tribune . . . [,] considered the rebellion in China to be a sign . . . that 
demonstrated the interconnectedness of the industrial world.”  Id.  
93
 See MORGAN, supra note 7, at 90 (discussing the Legal Services Act of 2007). 
94
 Joe Palazzolo & Chelsea Phipps, Law Schools Apply the Brakes, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2011. 
95
 See id. (quoting Professor William Henderson of Indiana University).  
96
 Lincoln Caplan, Editorial, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012 (quoting Wu); see 
also Karen Sloan, It's a Buyers’ Market at Law Schools, NAT’L L.J., June 25, 2012 (“Law schools experienced a 25 
percent decline in applicants nationwide during the past two years, . . . [and many] have responded by accepting a 
larger percentage of applicants and sweetening their scholarship packages.”). 
97
 See In the Matter of the Implementation of APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal 
Technicians, Order No. 25700-A-1006, 2012 WA REG TEXT 300583 (NS), available at 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2012) 
98
 Id. R. 28(D)(3) (stating education and experience requirements). 
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and drafting (subject review and approval by a Washington lawyer), explaining what other 
documents the client may need, and assisting the client in obtaining necessary documents.99 
It would be useless to argue that the legal profession should seek to maintain the status 
quo because the law of lawyering has matured to the point where legal ethics standards of 
conduct and enforcement mechanisms are now reasonably effective.  However, it is very 
appropriate to ask: how will the goals so thoughtfully advanced by the current regime be 
effectively promoted if the now-unitary legal profession fragments into a multitude of legal 
services providers?  Presumably, in that kind of world, not every provider will be bound by the 
same ethics code or subject to the same malpractice principles. 
B. The Vanishing American Lawyer 
Professor Thomas D. Morgan’s provocatively named new book, The Vanishing American 
Lawyer,100 offers a commanding and perceptive analysis of the gathering storm in both American 
legal education and the American legal profession.  One of the greatest strengths of that volume, 
published by Oxford University Press, is that the intellectual sweep of Morgan’s argument is 
accompanied by abundant citations.  His description of the forces that are reshaping the 
American legal profession is backed by evidence, both contemporary and historical.  In many 
instances, the facts that are mustered in support of the author’s analysis span decades or even 
centuries. 
The key premise of The Vanishing American Lawyer is that “lawyers are facing 
fundamental changes in both what they will be asked to do and whether the work they once did 
will continue to be done by lawyers at all.”101  Morgan asserts that “the ‘lawyer’ role known by 
generations of Americans and others is vanishing.”102  His thesis is grounded in a careful 
examination of the “the expansion in the number of lawyers, the prohibition of many [traditional] 
anti-competitive professional practices, the globalization of lawyer work, and the transformation 
of that work by new forms of technology.”103  Morgan also considers “the rising power of in-
house counsel”104 and the “declining significance of licensure and protective regulatory 
standards.”105  “It is in the context of these developments that the vision of the lawyer the world 
once knew is vanishing.”106 
Morgan acknowledges that “[l]egal regulation is not vanishing.” 107  He says that, “indeed, 
as society becomes more complex, the place of law in regulating conduct is likely to increase.”108  
Yet he asserts that “it does not follow that a system based on law requires lawyers, as we now 
know them, to run effectively.”109 
                                                          
99
 Id. R. 28(F) (describing the scope of practice authorized by the limited practice rules). 
100
 MORGAN, supra note 7. 
101
 Id. at 3. 
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 Id. at 12. 
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 Id. at 99. 
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 Id. at 112-20. 
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1. Increasing Complexity and Specialization 
Morgan argues that “the interaction of law with increasingly complex economic and 
social issues will make distinctively legal questions less common and make many of the skills 
now honed in law schools less relevant.”110  “[R]eality may require that more persons, not fewer, 
have some legal training, but the training of most such persons will almost certainly not be 
today’s three-year graduate program designed to produce an all-purpose legal generalist.”111  
Amplifying this point, Morgan predicts that “lawyers will likely have to focus their work in those 
fields where they can be known as among the best,”112 and that “few lawyers will likely stray far 
from the kinds of work they know how to perform extremely well.”113 
“Today’s lawyers,” Morgan argues, “will not be unemployable, but for at least significant 
parts of their careers, they will be required to develop specialized expertise both in an area of 
substantive law, and in the non-legal aspects of their clients’ problems.”114  More ominously, 
Morgan ventures, “[t]he future American lawyer is likely to spend his or her career in a perpetual 
tournament trying to stand out among a collection of diverse service providers, each offering to 
contribute more to a client than they can charge the client for their service.”115 
In one of many memorable turns of phrase,116 Morgan assets that “the concept of a 
lawyer we have known will become a part of history, along with the knights and mercenaries 
who were hired to fight the battles of others in earlier times.”117  While he maintains that the 
“direction of change seems inevitable,” he concedes that the “rate of change is harder to 
predict.”118  Nevertheless, Morgan predicts that “a major transformation of the American legal 
profession can be expected within the next decade or so.”119 
2. Educational Heterogeneity 
Regarding changes in legal education, Morgan argues that the “homogeneity” represented 
by the standard three-year juris doctorate program “should end.”120  He speculates, for example, 
that “[a] one-year program involving thinking like a lawyer, legal research and writing, and 
perhaps negotiation, . . . might be worked into an undergraduate college program . . . [or] might 
represent a first year of post-graduate study leading to a masters of arts degree.”121  He suggests 
that “[g]raduates of such a program would be unlikely to hold themselves out as legal advisors, 
but such an education might be highly useful . . . to business people trying to understand the way 
law impacts their activities.”122  While the latter point is beyond doubt, the former is far from 
                                                          
110
 Id. at 15; see also id. at 134 (similar). 
111
 MORGAN, supra note 7, at 15. 
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 Id. at 130. 
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clear.  What would be more natural, in a world where is it is difficult for the bar to police the 
unauthorized practice of law, and where many think that legal services cost too much, than for a 
nonlawyer with some significant measure of legal training to offer legal advice at a lower price? 
Morgan, a former law school dean at Emory University and former president of the 
Association of American Law Schools, now teaches at George Washington University.  He 
suggests that law schools should once again consider offering a two-year law degree.123 Some 
law schools have already taken steps to accelerate completion of a juris doctorate degree, which 
has traditionally taken three years to earn.124  While those schools have not reduced the number 
of credit hours required for graduation, there may come a point where the American Bar 
Association,125 perhaps because of the soaring cost of legal education,126 may be willing to 
endorse an “Executive J.D.”127 or similar academic credential that requires something closer to 
60 semester credit hours for graduation, rather than the standard 83 to 90 credit hours.128  In fact, 
Morgan’ idea may be gaining traction.  A recent editorial in The New York Times asserted that 
“some law schools are earnestly considering two-year J.D. programs.” 129 
Morgan argues that “[e]ven without formal recognition of a two-year degree, . . . such 
education might be recognized as a basis for certification to give legal advice and appear before 
particular specialized courts.”130  This idea, too, may be plausible.  There is precedent in the 
administrative sphere.  An Executive Order issued by President Bill Clinton encouraged federal 
agencies to permit nonlawyers to represent other persons in proceedings before them.131  Some 
federal agencies now do so,132 and the same is true in several states.133 
                                                          
123
 Id. at 214 (asserting that the Carnegie Commission’s 1971 recommendation “deserves another look”). 
124
 See Accelerated JD, NORTHWESTERN LAW, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/academics/ajd/ (last visited July 
16, 2012) (noting that students in the accelerated program complete the same number of credits as students in the 
traditional program); SCALE Curriculum, SOUTHWESTERN LAW SCH., 
http://www.swlaw.edu/academics/jd/scale/curriculum (last visited July 16, 2012) (showing that the curriculum for 
the two-year J.D. program requires 87 units); Earn Your J.D. in Two Years, UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON SCH. OF LAW, 
http://www.udayton.edu/law/academics/jd_program/two_year_option.php (last visited July 16, 2012) (showing that 
90 credit hours are required for the University’s two-year J.D. program); Fast Track Accelerated Option Leads to 
Graduation in Two Years, WASHBURN U. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.washburnlaw.edu/admissions/fasttrack (last 
visited July 16, 2012) (same).    
125
 Cf. MORGAN, supra note 7, at 215 (suggesting that, at least in some cases, new programs providing legal 
education—e.g., at the undergraduate or mid-career level—“almost certainly” should not be subject to accreditation 
by the American Bar Association); id. (“Accreditation should be understood to be a process of protecting the public 
from deception about the quality of the education offered, and while the A.B.A. has largely done a conscientious 
job, the time has come to pass the responsibility to others.”). 
126
 See Legal Education Costs More than $200,000, Study Finds, NAT’L JURIST (May 11, 2012), 
http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/legal-education-costs-more-200000-study-finds-0 (discussing a study by Law 
School Transparency that shows that the "non discounted cost" of a legal education (including tuition, living 
expenses, and finance expenses) exceeds $200,000). 
127
 Some law schools not accredited by the American Bar Association offer executive J.D. programs.  See Taft Law 
School, The Jurisdoctor Executive Track Program, http://www.taftu.edu/tls/lw2.htm (last visited). 
128
 See Program of Legal Education, 2011-2012 Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools,  
AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2012_standards_chapter
_3.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited July 18, 2012) (mandating accredited law schools to require students to complete 
a minimum of 58,000 minutes—or 83 semester hours for law schools using a conventional semester system—as a 
condition for obtaining a J.D. degree).  
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 Lincoln Caplan, Editorial, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012. 
130
 MORGAN, supra note 7, at 214. 
131
 See Exec. Order No. 12988, 3 C.F.R. 157, 161 (1997), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (2006). Part 4 of the 
Executive Order states in relevant part: “All Federal agencies should review their administrative adjudicatory 
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Elaborating on the possibilities for fundamentally restructuring legal education—which 
include specialization during the third-year of law school,134 significant attention to “non-legal 
subjects such as languages, finance, and science,”135 and mid-career certificate programs136—
Morgan explains:  “The three-year program might remain the legal education gold standard, at 
least until two-year graduates prove their success in the marketplace.”137  “Almost inevitably, the 
nation will need far fewer law schools . . . or at least most will need to transform themselves and 
their offerings if they want to survive.”138 
3. Durable Areas of Practice 
Despite the title of Morgan’s book, it seems clear that American lawyers will not vanish, 
at least not entirely.  Indeed, some segments of the bar are likely to prosper by traversing the 
same familiar paths.  This may be true of those members of the legal profession who specialize 
in criminal or domestic relations law, staff government offices, or handle run-of-the-mill tort 
claims for plaintiffs (to the extent that such claims are still viable after ubiquitous “tort 
reform”139).  In those areas, it is unlikely that there will be a lack of clients.  It is also improbable 
that such work will be outsourced to another country140 or delegated to persons not licensed to 
practice law, at least in matters that involve litigation.141  Cost-cutting pressures may not 
fundamentally transform these types of law practice.  Morgan himself opines that “[n]egotiation 
and litigation of contested matters is likely to remain one of the last places from which American 
lawyers will vanish.”142   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
processes and develop specific procedures to . . . facilitate self-representation where appropriate . . . [and] to expand 
non-lawyer counseling and representation where appropriate.” Id.  See generally Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Civil Justice 
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 Id. at 214. 
138
 Id. at 216. 
139
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Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 906 (2008) (noting that “hundreds of medical malpractice tort reforms have been 
enacted” over the last several decades); David A. Anderson, Judicial Tort Reform in Texas, 26 REV. LITIG. 1, 3 
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Race, Gender, and Radical Tort Reform: A Review of Martha Chamallas & Jennifer B. Wriggins, The Measure of 
Injury: Race, Gender, and Tort Law, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 591, 609 (2011) (noting “the efforts of ‘tort 
reformers’ decrying lawsuit ‘abuse’”). 
140
 But see Vincent R. Johnson & Stephen C. Loomis, Legal Malpractice Liability Related to Foreign Outsourcing 
of Legal Services, 2 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALP. & ETHICS 262, 276-81 (2012) (discussing the wide range of 
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 However, it may make sense to outsource research and drafting related to complex tort claims to lower-cost 
providers in other countries.  See Cassandra Burke Robertson, A Collaborative Model of Offshore Legal 
Outsourcing, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 125, 125-26 (2011) (discussing a libel suit in California where the drafting of the 
motion for summary judgment and appellate brief were outsourced to lawyers in India). 
142
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However, other varieties of lawyering may radically change.  The most obvious candidate is 
business representation, particularly as it relates to commercial matters.  It is in that area that the 
cost-cutting pressures of globalization will be the greatest. 
IV. Restructuring Legal Ethics 
A. The Goals of Legal Ethics 
Although some of the rules of American legal ethics, such as the restrictions on lawyer 
advertising and solicitation, may have originated in a desire to discriminate against minorities143 
or to protect established lawyers from competition,144 the present regime contains few traces of 
that past.  The relevant provisions of modern legal ethics have been debated so vigorously, so 
often, and in so many fora during the past forty years145 that virtually every rule that has survived 
scrutiny and is currently in force can be justified on multiple legitimate grounds.   
Before the Clark Report and Watergate,146 legal ethics reform was a low profile endeavor, 
often screened from public view.147  The current era stands in sharp contrast.  Legal ethics reform 
today operates with a high degree of transparency.148  Disclosure and public scrutiny of 
proposals are used as means for ensuring that the substantive provisions of the law of lawyering 
are consistent with the public interest, just as reporting requirements in government ethics,149 and 
statutes mandating open meetings and open records,150 are used today to promote good 
government.  
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 See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 42-48 
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1969] came out of confidential meetings of its drafting committee, so there was no public debate . . . .  Indeed, most 
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 See Lillian Hardwick, A Supreme Collaboration, 74 TEX. B.J. 50, 51 (2011) (discussing the importance of public 
comments in shaping legal ethics reform proposals in Texas). 
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effectiveness of periodic reporting requirements depends upon public and governmental scrutiny of the reported 
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The complex rules of American legal ethics are animated by a variety of important 
concerns.  Those goals and objectives are so numerous, nuanced, and intertwined that it is not 
possible to specify a definitive comprehensive list.151  Nevertheless, it is clear beyond question 
that the law of professional responsibility includes standards which are intended to (1) protect 
clients from unnecessary harm, (2) encourage legal resolution of disputes, (3) ensure client 
control of legal representation, (4) promote honesty and fairness in public and private affairs, and 
(5) assure the proper functioning of the justice system.   
For example, clients are protected from harm by the disciplinary rules which mandate 
lawyer competence152 and diligence,153 prohibit conflicts of interest,154 regulate fee 
arrangements,155 limit in-person solicitation, 156 require safekeeping of property,157 and address 
the special interests of clients with diminished capacity.158  More broadly, legal malpractice 
actions based on negligence and fiduciary-duty principles are intended to protect clients from 
deficient practices by lawyers that cause injuries. 
Persons are encouraged to resolve disputes through legal channels—legitimate, peaceful 
means, not force or violence—in many ways.  These avenues include the ethics rules that enable 
clients to obtain accurate information about the terms and availability of legal services,159 that 
make legal services more readily available to the poor,160 and that encourage clients to consult 
lawyers by guaranteeing that their information will be treated as confidential.161  
Client control of legal representation is facilitated by the ethics rules that allow clients to 
limit the scope of representation,162 require lawyers to communicate material information,163 and 
limit the terms upon which a law practice may be sold.164  The same objective is furthered by the 
ethical provisions which oblige lawyers to clarify their allegiances when dealing with entity 
constituents.165 
Honesty in public and private affairs is the basis for numerous ethics rules.166  These 
include the standards that require candor to tribunals167 and truthfulness in statements to 
others,168 including statements to bar admission and disciplinary authorities. 169 
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The proper functioning of the administration of justice is fostered by the ethics rules 
which promote judicial impartiality by prohibiting improper communications with judges.170 
Confidence in the administration of justice is also advanced by the rules imposing special 
obligations on prosecutors, 171 limiting trial publicity,172 prohibiting frivolous litigation,173 
mandating reporting of misconduct,174 and requiring fair treatment of third persons.175 
These five objectives—(1) protecting clients from unnecessary harm, (2) encouraging 
legal resolution of disputes, (3) ensuring client control of legal representation, (4) promoting 
honesty and fairness in public and private affairs, and (5) assuring the proper functioning of the 
justice system—are major goals of American legal ethics.  They reflect public policy concerns of 
continuing importance.  If the legal profession changes in ways that make it difficult or 
impossible for professional discipline and malpractice liability to effectively promote these goals, 
then any substitute regime for holding legal service providers accountable176 must be judged by 
how well it furthers these same objectives.  To paraphrase Professor Neil Hamilton, “[t]he 
ultimate question is not whether the concepts of a ‘profession’ and ‘professionalism’ in actual 
practice are flawed, but whether the alternative . . . is more flawed in serving the public good.”177 
B. The Challenges of Professional Disunification 
The American legal profession today remains largely unified.  In general, law is still 
practiced only by lawyers who, because of their monopoly (or near-monopoly) status, are subject 
to special obligations and held accountable in disciplinary and malpractice actions.  However, if 
the profession is transformed by the increasing rendition of legal services by nonlawyers, or by 
the emergence of new categories of lawyers who are not fully licensed, the efficacy of the 
current legal ethics regime will be seriously challenged. 
1. Obstacles to Discipline  
Professional discipline can be effective in deterring bad practices and holding deficient 
practitioners accountable only if there are clearly developed standards of conduct that can be 
used as the basis for education and imposition of sanctions.  Moreover, the deterrent effect of 
possible disciplinary action is credible only when there is an enforcement authority with 
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 See Matthew Huisman, Courts See Increase in Bankruptcy Filing Abuse by Nonlawyers, LEGAL TIMES, June 18, 
2012 (“There has been an increase in the number of complaints against non-lawyers preparing bankruptcy filings for 
a fee, according to . . . the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.”). 
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adequate resources and power to thoroughly investigate complaints of misconduct and ensure 
that sanctions are imposed regularly and consistently.178 
The rendition of legal services by nonlawyers poses obvious problems for the use of 
professional discipline as a mechanism for protecting clients and assuring the proper operation of 
the legal system.  In many instances, as regards nonlawyer practitioners, there will be no well-
developed code of professional conduct, no authorized and adequately resourced investigative 
authority, and no power to impose discipline.  Nonlawyers practicing before agencies and 
tribunals may be obliged to adhere to codes of conduct adopted by those entities to guide the 
conduct of persons who appear in a representative capacity.179  Yet, it seems likely that such 
standards will focus only on the most obvious problems, and that agencies will have limited 
procedures and resources for the investigation of complaints.  Sanctions are likely to be imposed 
only in the clearest cases. 
The provision of legal services by persons who are not fully licensed poses different 
problems than practice by nonlawyers for the maintenance of an effective disciplinary regime.  A 
process might be structured so that those practitioners not fully licensed would be subject to 
some, but not all, of the obligations that bind fully licensed lawyers.  The arrangement might be 
similar, in certain respects, to that embodied in the terms of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which 
imposes on part-time judges only some of the many obligations that comprise the law of judicial 
ethics.180  However, it would be difficult to decide which of the important obligations in the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, or more accurately in the parallel state enactments, should 
not be binding on lawyers who are not fully licensed.  (Confidentiality?  Competence?  
Reasonable fees?  Conflict of interest?)  The consumer-friendly course might be to hold all 
lawyers licensed by a jurisdiction, in whatever capacity, to the full range of ethical obligations, 
though certainly those not enjoying a full license might have grounds to object. 
The Supreme Court of Washington’s “Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal 
Technicians,”181 imposes some, but not all, of the obligations traditionally found in legal ethics 
codes on legal technicians who are not fully licensed to practice law.  A limited license 
technician must return client documents,182 protect the confidentiality of client information,183 
and refrain from promising “special influence with any court or governmental agency”184 or 
misleading the client about the legal technician’s professional skills.185  The Rule further 
provides that “Limited License Legal Technicians shall be held to the ethical standards of the 
Limited License Legal Technicians’ Rules of Professional Conduct, what shall create an . . . 
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 See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 1 (Final Draft 1970) (finding that “[l]ack of adequate 
financing [was] the most universal and significant problem in disciplinary enforcement”). 
179
 See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Representation By Non-Lawyers, 2 ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 6:24 (3d ed. 2005) (“Agencies 
which permit representation by non-lawyers may establish standards of conduct for them, including the same 
standards as that applied to lawyers. Such agencies may also discipline non-lawyers for violating their standards of 
conduct.”). 
180
 See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Notes on Application Preceding Canon 1 (2010). 
181
 See In the Matter of the Implementation of APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal 
Technicians, Order No. 25700-A-1006, 2012 WA REG TEXT 300583 (NS), available at 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2012) 
182
 Id. R. 28(G)(3)(c) & (H)(3). 
183
 Id. R. 28(G)(3)(e). 
184
 Id. R. 28(H)(1). 
185
 Id. R. 28(G)(3)(c). 
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IOLTA program for the proper handling of funds comings into the possession of the Limited 
License Legal Technician.”186 
2. Obstacles to Malpractice 
In the absence of clearly tortious conduct, such as stealing a client’s money,187 lying to a 
client about material matters,188 or sexually abusing a client,189 the viability of a malpractice 
action normally turns upon establishing both what the standard of care required on the facts of 
the case, and that the standard was violated.  In many malpractice actions, the former point is a 
hotly debated issue on which expert testimony is elicited by the parties to the dispute.190  In the 
absence of persuasive testimony as to what the standard of care demanded, a legal malpractice 
action will fail.191   
The standard of care for a malpractice suit can be articulated only by reference to 
practices and principles so well established that they form a dependable guide for the exercise of 
judgment by a jury.  It is because of difficulties in establishing an alternative standard of care 
that lawyers practicing law in large firms are not held to a different standard of care than solo 
practitioners, and that lawyers with twenty years of experience are not held to a different 
standard than those who recently entered the profession.192  In most circumstances, there is no 
reliable way of establishing what a reasonably prudent large-firm lawyer would do that can be 
confidently distinguished from what a reasonably prudent solo practitioner would do, or what a 
reasonably prudent lawyer with twenty years experience would do differently than a reasonably 
prudent lawyer with much less experience. 
Suing nonlawyers for malpractice under traditional principle of negligence and fiduciary 
duty would be, in most instances, impracticable because ordinarily it would be impossible to 
establish how much care a nonlawyer would use in a particular situation (not to mention the fact 
that the relationship between a nonlawyer and a client might but not be deemed to be fiduciary).  
Except in the context of representing clients before agencies or tribunals that have adopted 
standards of conduct for nonlawyers,193 there would usually be no code of ethics that could be 
used as a point of reference for determining what a reasonably prudent nonlawyer would do.194  
Moreover, any effort to qualify a witness as a testifying expert on nonlawyer practices and 
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 Id. R. 28(K)(2). 
187
 See Morris v. Zimmer, No. 10 CV 4146(VB), 2011 WL 5533339, at *7 (S.D. N.Y. 2011) (holding that plaintiffs 
properly stated a claim for conversion by alleging that their attorney “improperly retained settlement proceeds 
belonging to them and used those proceeds in his business without their permission”). 
188
 See Valentine v. Watters, 896 So. 2d 385, 395 (Ala. 2004) (holding that expert testimony was not necessary in a 
malpractice action where the defendant lawyer purportedly lied to a client about his experience in handling previous 
breast implant litigation). 
189
 See Kling v. Landry, 292 Ill. App. 3d 329, 339 (Ill. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1997) (holding that a plaintiff who alleged 
that her attorney sexually abused her properly stated a claim of battery). 
190
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52(2) cmt. g (2000) (discussing expert 
testimony). 
191
 See Moore v. Crone, 114 970 A.2d 757, 760 (2009) (affirming a grant of summary judgment to a lawyer because 
the plaintiff client failed to adduce expert testimony to establish the standard of care in a legal malpractice action 
arising from criminal representation). 
192
 See VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 87-88 (2011) (discussing de facto 
specialists and large firm lawyers). 
193
 See Part IV-B-1. 
194
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52(2) cmt. g (2000) (explaining the relevance 
of ethics rules in malpractice actions). 
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obligations would presumably run into serious difficulties as judges perform the important 
“gatekeeping” function that requires them to exclude from the courtroom unreliable evidence.195 
An alternative would be to hold nonlawyers rendering legal services liable for 
malpractice if they fall short of the standard of care that would be observed by lawyers.  There is 
some precedent196 and scholarship197 supporting this view.  However, requiring nonlawyers to 
adhere to the same exacting standards that bind lawyers may be unfair in cases where the 
nonlawyer has not pretended to be a lawyer or promised to render equivalent services.198 
Morgan notes that, “[e]ven today, malpractice insurance companies have an incentive to 
audit lawyer compliance with professional standards more rigorously than lawyer disciplinary 
commissions will ever do.”199  However, if it not possible to articulate the standard of care for a 
malpractice action based on negligence or fiduciary-duty principles, there will be less risk of 
liability being imposed on lawyers and reduced reason for insurers to counsel law firms to adopt 
risk-reducing practices. 
C. Alternative Contract Principles 
Professor Morgan minimizes the importance of professional discipline in the emerging 
legal world.  He opines that “private actions against lawyers who fail to meet the promised 
standard are likely to replace formal discipline as the principal regulator of lawyer activity.”200 
In a recent article in the St. Mary’s Law Journal, he suggested that contract principles can 
provide an appropriate legal regime for holding nonlawyers accountable for deficient conduct.201  
This proposal merits careful consideration, not only because it comes from one of the most 
respected legal ethics scholars, but because it has a certain natural appeal insofar as tort law and 
contract law are both part of the law of private obligations.202  On one hand, obligations are 
imposed by law, while on the other they are voluntarily assumed.  There are many instances 
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 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 
U.S. 579, 597 (1993)) (indicating that trial judges, in admitting expert testimony, have a gatekeeping responsibility 
to “[e]nsure that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand”). 
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 See Thomas D. Morgan, Professional Malpractice in a World of Amateurs, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 891, 900 & n.32 
(2009) (citing, e.g., Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 45 P.3d 1068, 1070 (Wash. 2002); Buscemi v. Intachai, 730 So. 2d 
329, 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Webb v. Pomeroy, 655 P.2d 465, 468 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982)) (discussing cases 
that have held nonlawyers engaged in legal services to the same professional standard of care as lawyers). 
197
 See Sande L. Buhai, Act Like a Lawyer, Be Judged Like a Lawyer, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 87, 91 (2007) (arguing 
that non-licensed persons “who engage in the compensated practice of law” should be held to the same standard of 
care imposed on licensed attorneys). 
198
 See Thomas D. Morgan, Professional Malpractice in a World of Amateurs, 40 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL 891, 
903 (2009) (arguing that while “[a]nyone who impersonates a lawyer should be held to the standard of a lawyer[,]” 
nonlawyers should not otherwise be held to the same standard of care); id. at 904 (citing Bland v. Reed, 67 Cal. 
Rptr. 859, 862 (Ct. App. 1968) (“[W]e consider it improper to hold a non-lawyer practicing before the Commission 
to a lawyer’s degree of care . . . .”)). 
199
 MORGAN, supra note 7, at 231 n.35. 
200
 Id. at 231. 
201
 See Thomas D. Morgan, Professional Malpractice in A World of Amateurs, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 891, 903 (2009) 
(“Instead of holding nonlawyers to a tort standard that treats them as if they were lawyers, I suggest we move toward 
a contract-based standard that asks what the nonlawyer purported to be competent to do and whether she met a 
client's reasonable expectations about the services to be provided. The burden of proof would initially be on the 
plaintiff client, and the nonlawyer defendant could show specific disclaimers of experience or limits on work to be 
done.”). 
202
 See Lucinda Furguson, Family, Social Inequalities, and the Persuasive Force of Interpersonal Obligation, 22 
INT'L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 61, 64 (2008) (listing formation of a contract and injuring another through negligence as 
examples of events that trigger private law obligations). 
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where even though a remedy is not available under tort law, contract law will provide a basis for 
redress.203   
1. Private Ordering and Its Limits 
As the law of legal ethics is presently configured, contract principles play an important, but 
limited role in affording protection to consumers of legal services.  Most significantly, lawyers 
and clients are afforded great latitude in defining the scope of the professional relationship and 
the extent of a lawyer’s obligations.  The parties to the representation can agree, for example, 
that the lawyer will be obliged to review whether a document accurately reflects the terms of an 
agreement reached by the client and another party, but has no duty to evaluate and advise the 
client upon the wisdom of the terms of the settlement.204  A lawyer and client may also agree, in 
many instances, that the lawyer has no duty to advise the client on the tax consequences of 
actions with legal significance.205  Similarly, a lawyer and client may contractually provide that 
the lawyer will handle only one of several matters for which the client might logically decide to 
engage legal representation.206 
The power of the lawyer and client to order the terms of the relationship between them is 
limited in significant respects.  The terms of a lawyer-client agreement will be void as against 
public policy if they are unlawful,207 unethical,208 or unreasonable in light of the fiduciary nature 
of the relationship.209  Thus, a lawyer and client may not agree that the lawyer will assist the 
client in a fraudulent enterprise,210 tamper with witnesses or evidence,211 conceal client 
perjury,212 or so severely limit the scope of performance as to render incompetent services.213  
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 See, e.g., East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 876 (1986) (holding the pure 
economic losses resulting from damage to a product by a component part are compensable under contract law, but 
not in a tort action for negligence or strict liability). 
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 See Lerner v. Laufer, 819 A.2d 471, 484 (N.J. App. Div. 2003) (holding that a lawyer did not breach the standard 
of care by not performing discovery or investigatory services related to the fairness of a property settlement 
agreement because the scope of representation was limited to exclude those services and there was no dispute 
relating to the client’s “competence, her general knowledge of the family’s financial and personal affairs, or the 
voluntariness of her actions”). 
205
 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2012) (permitting a lawyer and client to limit the scope of 
representation); Thomas D. Morgan, Professional Malpractice in a World of Amateurs, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 891, 907 
(2009) (“If a lawyer wishes to help a client get a divorce but not take responsibility for tax implications of the 
settlement, for example, [Model] Rule 1.2(c) expressly permits that arrangement.”).  But see 4 RONALD E. MALLEN 
& JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 35:4 (2012 ed.) (noting that failure to stipulate “whether tax advice is 
within the scope of the engagement” is a recurring error frequently leading to legal malpractice claims).   
206
 See Michele N. Struffolino, Taking Limited Representation to the Limits: The Efficacy of Using Unbundled Legal 
Services in Domestic-Relations Matters Involving Litigation, 2 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALP. & ETHICS 166, 188-89 
(2012) (discussing vertical and horizontal “unbundling”). 
207
 See Keliin v. Petrucelli, 499 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that attorney-client agreements 
solicited in violation of Michigan law are void). 
208
 Cf. Fair v. Bakhtiari, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 765, 776-783 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that an attorney’s conflict of 
interest and other ethical violations were sufficient to render an attorney-client agreement void). 
209
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 19(1)(b) (2000) (“[A] client and lawyer may 
agree to limit a duty that a lawyer would otherwise owe to a client if: (b) the terms of the limitation are reasonable in 
the circumstances.”); In re Egwim, 291 B.R. 559, 574 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2003) (holding that, in bankruptcy 
proceedings, an “attorney's representation ordinarily must extend to all matters relating to the relief sought by the 
chapter 7 debtor, and particular services required to pursue that relief normally cannot be excluded”). 
210
 Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2012) (“A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a 
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.”). 
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2. Promises are Not Default Principles 
While contract law allows for private ordering of the lawyer-client relationship, it does little 
to supply default principles to guarantee adequate performance of legal services.  As in most 
other contexts, the buyer must think about the risks and bargain for desired protection.214  In the 
absence of an express promise by the provider, there is little chance that the recipient will be able 
to sue for breach of contract.215  A claim against a lawyer may be based on nonperformance of an 
implied promise, 216 but that possibility is more theoretical than real.  Few malpractice actions for 
breach of contract have been founded upon obligations not proven to have been expressly 
stated.217 
Occasional judicial decisions have allowed jurors leeway in deciding what was promised by 
a lawyer to a client.  For example, in Pierce v. Cook,218 a lawyer, who was jointly representing a 
husband, wife, and child on personal injury claims, commenced an affair with the wife during the 
representation.  The Supreme Court of Mississippi allowed the husband and child to recover a 
substantial malpractice judgment based in part on a breach of contract theory, holding that it was 
for the jurors to decide what promises had been made by the defendant lawyer. 219  However, 
decisions like Pierce are notable not because they are common, but because they are so rare.  A 
client who fails to bargain for particular performance by a lawyer typically has little chance of 
prevailing in a contract-based malpractice action.  
3. Deficiencies in the Contract Model 
The question then is whether contract law principles, which are so seldom a basis for lawyer 
liability, might somehow play an important role in assuring that nonlawyers and lawyers who are 
not fully licensed are deterred from causing harm to clients and held accountable for deficient 
conduct.  A negative answer to this query is strongly suggested by five factors, including the 
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 Cf. Former Prince George's County Executive Disbarred in D.C., The BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES, available at 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2012/07/former-prince-georges-county-executive-disbarred-in-dc.html (last visited 
July 13, 2012) (reporting that a lawyer was disbarred based on attempted extortion and witness tampering). 
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 Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2012) (“A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative 
proceeding and who knows that a person . . . has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding 
shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.”). 
213
 Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 7 (2012) (“[A]n agreement for a limited representation does 
not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation.”). 
214
 See Jay M. Feinman, The Economic Loss Rule and Private Ordering, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 813, 813-26 (2006) 
(“[I]ndividuals are the best judges of their own interests; individuals maximize those interests through contracts; the 
expectation and reliance interests created by contracts deserve protection; promoting private contracting produces a 
social benefit; contract law provides the framework through which the individual and social benefits are realized in 
practice.”). 
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 See 4 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8:6 (2012 ed.) (listing breach of an 
express promise as a requirement for a breach of contract cause of action); see also G.K. Las Vegas Ltd. P’ship v. 
Boies Schiller & Flexner LLP, 947 N.Y.S.2d 29, 30-31 (App. Div. 2012) (denying recovery for “breach of an 
alleged oral agreement to have a particular attorney . . . serve as lead counsel . . . [because] the client failed to 
preserve its arguments that the law firm did not meet its burden of demonstrating that  the client fully understood the 
terms of the parties' retainer agreement”). 
216
 See generally id. § 8:7 (discussing implied contracts in the context of legal malpractice claims). 
217
 See id. § 8:6 (“The prevailing rule is that there is no cause of action for breach of an express contract unless the 
wrong sued for is breach of a specific promise.”).  
218
 992 So. 2d 612 (Miss. 2008). 
219
 Id. at 618. 
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unrealistic prospect of clients bargaining for protection,220 the absence of implied warranties for 
services,221 problems of proof,222 limited damages,223 and inconsistent client treatment.224 
a. Unrealistic Bargaining 
It would be difficult or impossible—not to mention prohibitively expensive—for clients to 
bargain with legal services providers for the level of protection currently afforded by the law of 
negligence.  This is true for several reasons. 
The reasonable care standard that is the centerpiece of the law of negligence incorporates, 
through expert testimony, many of the numerous professional obligations that are articulated in 
ethics codes.225  Those duties include, but are certainly not limited to, competence,226 
communication,227 confidentiality,228 loyalty,229 safekeeping of client property,230 and 
transactional fairness,  relating both to fees231 and other pecuniary matters.232  It would be the 
rare client who thought to address all of those matters in a contract with a legal services 
provider.233  And even if client knew that those matters are important, the bargaining process 
would be excessively tedious and costly.  Merely addressing the numerous varieties of conflict of 
interest that can threaten a legal services provider’s loyalty to the client would be an exhausting 
undertaking.  Quite likely, in the wide range of circumstances, important matters would be 
unaddressed, and there would be no promise by the provider that could form the basis for a suit 
for breach of contract. 
Holding nonlawyers, or lawyers not fully licensed, to a “do what you promise”234 standard 
would, in many instances, amount to hollow protection.235  In proposing that standard, Morgan 
seems to be thinking more about what constitutes professional competence than about what 
comprises the broad fabric of ethical obligations that amount to such a large part of what protects 
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 See Thomas D. Morgan, Professional Malpractice in A World of Amateurs, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 891, 905 (2009) 
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 The question of whether contract-based malpractice actions can effectively replace tort-based malpractice actions 
is related to the debate that has been raging recently around the so-called “economic loss rule.”  The question there 
is whether purely economic losses should be remedied only under contract law and not under tort principles.  In that 
debate I have argued that:  “Tort law can offer a more efficient path than contract law to deterring and compensating 
some forms of economic harm . . . .  Relegating persons to exclusively contract remedies for purely economic losses 
will effectively immunize defendants from liability in a wide range of cases. This is undesirable for, in many cases, 
unnecessary economic harm should be deterred through legal principles that create an incentive for safe practices 
through risk of liability.”  Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 523, 582-83 (2009). 
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clients from harm.  Morgan recognizes the possible disadvantage for clients, but sees the 
alternative as worse.  Morgan states, “The fact is that lawyers can often do a sufficiently better 
job than nonlawyers and my standard may leave some clients with a reduced standard of 
protection. I suggest—and leave to others’ evaluation—however, that nonlawyer representation 
will, on balance, tend to be better than no representation at all. And the latter, I fear, will be 
many potential clients’ only realistic alternative to nonlawyer assistance.”236 
b. Absence of Implied Warranties 
It seems doubtful that the law of warranties could fill the gap in legal protection left by the 
failure of clients to bargain for protection with a legal services provider.  First, American law 
generally distinguishes between goods and services.  Warranties are implied for goods, but not 
for services.237  For example, the Uniform Commercial Code, which imposes warranties for 
merchantability238 and fitness for a particular purpose, 239 applies only to sales of goods. 240  The 
UCC protections do not apply to sales of services,241 or even to mixed sale-service transactions, 
if those transactions are predominantly for the provision of services, not goods. 242 
While there may be some commodity-like aspects to the rendition of legal services, what 
providers do characteristically involves the exercise of judgment243—judgment about which facts 
are relevant, what legal principles apply, or how best to protect or advance the interests of the 
client.244  Thus, it is highly unlikely that a lawyer or other legal services provider would be held 
liable to a client for breach of an implied warranty under principles such as those embodied in 
the UCC, or its international transaction counterpart, the Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods, 245 to which the United States is a party. 246 
Moreover, even if legal services providers were held liable for “unmerchantable” services, 
there would be a myriad of unanswered questions as to what that means.  Are law-related 
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 See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. America v. Cease Elec. Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462, 469 (Wis. 2004) (“[T]he U.C.C. 
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 See Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974) (noting that contracts are excluded from the UCC if the 
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“excellence of judgment”). 
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services “unmerchantable” if the provider has a conflict of interest, or fails to disclose material 
facts, or is unaware of relevant legal principles?  The law of legal ethics presently talks about 
these issues under malpractice rubric drawn from the law of negligence and fiduciary duty, but 
virtually never under the language of warranty.   Consequently, there is no existing body of legal 
services warranty precedent that could even begin to inform how warranty principles could be 
applied to nonlawyers or lawyers not fully licensed.  
c. Problems of Proof 
Relegating clients to remedies under contract principles would also entail problems of proof.  
An aggrieved client would presumably bear the burden of proving that a promise was in fact 
made.247  Unsophisticated clients would often not have thought about the advisability of 
memorializing the terms of the contract in writing.  Yet, absent such corroborating documentary 
evidence, a breach of contract action will be nothing more than the word of the client against the 
provider.  This reality would not only undercut the efficacy of contract law remedies for 
individual clients, but the likelihood that a judgment would deter bad practices by other legal 
services providers.  
Presumably, sophisticated clients, such as corporations, would be able to anticipate the need 
to bargain for contractual assurances and memorialize such obligations.248  Yet, an effective legal 
ethics regime cannot be built on the assumption that all clients will be sophisticated and able to 
engage in adequate self-protection. 
d. Limited Damages 
Another disadvantage of relegating clients to contract law remedies is the fact that contract 
law damages are typically less generous than recoveries under tort law.  In many instances, 
consequential damages are deemed to be insufficiently foreseeable to be awarded under contract 
principles, even though the same damages might be levied in a tort action under ordinary rules of 
proximate causation.  Consequently, clients may be undercompensated if forced to seek redress 
in an action for breach of contract.   
Punitive damages are almost never recoverable under contract law. 249  Yet, despite a host of 
relatively recent state250 and federal251 law restrictions, punitive damages still play an important 
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role in tort litigation arising from egregious conduct.252  Any diminution in the exposure of legal 
services providers to punitive damages liability would undercut the deterrent effect of the law in 
terms of discouraging abusive practices by other providers. 
The mere replacement of the present workhorse malpractice cause of action for negligence 
with contract-based liability would have little effect on the availability of punitive damages 
because ordinary negligence is never a predicate for a punitive damages award.253  Presumably, 
legal services providers would still be subject to tort liability for highly blameworthy conduct, 
such as fraud, conversion, and the tort of outrage.254   However, in some jurisdictions, such as 
Texas,255 gross negligence is a sufficient basis for an award of punitive damages.  If the 
substitution of contractual recovery for negligence liability eliminates the ability of clients to 
hold legal services providers liable for gross negligence under circumstances not amounting to 
another tort that warrants an award of punitive damages, that would make the law less effective 
in protecting clients.  
e. Inconsistent Client Treatment 
One of the great virtues of American legal ethics is that the rules tend to ensure a 
minimum level of performance in the rendition of legal services and consistent treatment of 
clients.  Thus, for example, under the present regime, even without bargaining for it, every client 
enjoys safeguards related to the handling of personal information256 and property,257 and every 
lawyer must measure up to the standard of competent performance.258  This not only increases 
the chances of individual client satisfaction by reducing the opportunities poor performance and 
abuse, it also builds confidence in the legal system.   
Clients know that lawyers must play by the “rules of the game,” even though those clients 
may have little understanding about what those rules provide.  As the result of the existence of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
law firm that gave allegedly defective advice to an estate executor intended to cause injury or acted with actual 
awareness of an extreme risk of harm, and that therefore there was no basis for a punitive award. 
 Many jurisdictions have capped the amount of punitive damages that may be recovered from a defendant, 
either in tort actions generally or in legal malpractice suits in particular.  Alaska generally restricts a punitive award 
to the greater of three times compensatory damages or $500,000. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.17.020(f) (Westlaw 
2012) (ordinarily allowing three times compensatory damages or $500,000); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-21-102 
(Westlaw 2012) (providing that punitive damages may not exceed actual damages or, if there are aggravating 
circumstances, three times the amount of actual damages). 
251
 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (stating that defendant's 
reprehensibility is “[t]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award”). 
252
 See, e.g., McDonald's Corp. v. Ogborn, 309 S.W.3d 274 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009) (upholding the punitive award of 
five million dollars to a young employee who was forced to strip in front of McDonald's managers as part of a hoax). 
253
 See 1 STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE § 4:11 (3d ed. 1997) (“What is manifestly evident from 
the authorities is that mere or ordinary negligence will not support an award of punitive damages.”). 
254
 See generally Alex B. Long, Lawyers Intentionally Inflicting Emotional Distress, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 55, 56 
(2012) (“While most IIED claims against attorneys fail, predicting whether a particular attorney's actions will be 
determined to have crossed the line into “extreme and outrageous” conduct is sometimes at least as difficult as it is 
with respect to other defendants”). 
255
 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.003 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2004) (requiring “(1) fraud; (2) malice; or 
(3) gross negligence”); see also Safeshred, Inc. v. Martinez, 365 S.W.3d 655, 662 (Tex. 2012) (“In a typical 
negligence case like medical malpractice, to recover exemplary damages a plaintiff must simply prove that the 
defendant was not merely negligent, but was grossly negligent or acted intentionally in causing the serious harm that 
is the subject of the cause of action.”). 
256
 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012) (“Confidentiality”). 
257
 Id. R. 1.15 (“Safekeeping Property”). 
258
 Id. R. 1.1 (“Competence”). 
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disciplinary and malpractice principles, clients can and do expect, in usually a vague and 
imprecise way, that, unless a special bargain has been struck, every lawyer-client relationship 
comes with all of the “standard equipment.” One consequence of this arrangement is that the 
legal system tends to be viewed as legitimate.  In a very real sense, clients enjoy a degree of 
equality before the law because everyone’s lawyer must conform to the same standards and 
operate within the same restrictions. 
The legitimacy of the legal system is crucial for many reasons.  Among other things, it 
facilitates the peaceful resolution of disputes, reduces the transaction costs of hiring an attorney, 
and builds respect to the judgments of the courts.   
Under a legal ethics regime based predominately on contract law principles—rather than 
negligence and fiduciary-duty law and disciplinary standards of conduct—it would be 
considerably more difficult for legal principles to ensure that the clients would be treated equally.  
The applicable admonition would be “buyers beware.”  In that environment, it would be harder 
for the legal system to operate in a way that enjoys the confidence and respect of the citizenry. 
V. Conclusion 
 Despite its apparent vitality and comprehensive structure, the field of American legal 
ethics is vulnerable to the forces of change.  A looming transformation of the legal profession, 
catalyzed in large measure by technological innovations and globalization, threatens to undercut 
the central pillars of the current ethics regime.  If legal services are increasingly provided to 
clients by nonlawyers, or by lawyers who are not fully licensed, it will be ever more difficult for 
the legal system to rely on disciplinary codes and malpractice actions to hold those who provide 
legal services accountable and to deter improper practices.  To the extent that ethics rules and 
principles of negligence law and fiduciary duty are rendered irrelevant, or less operative than 
they are today, by professional disunification, it will be necessary to find a substitute legal 
regime to protect clients from harm and facilitate the proper operation of the justice system.   
 It seems doubtful that contract law principles can meet this challenge.  Contract law 
offers no great repository of client protection principles, but rather an array of rules which do as 
much to limit obligations as to create them.  The weak and unsophisticated are unlikely to be 
protected by contractual principles from those who would take advantage or were more loyal to 
promoting other interests. 
Rights under contract law would, of course, be supplemented by tort principles that 
impose liability for deception via actions for fraud and negligent misrepresentation.  Those torts 
would undoubtedly provide import protection from serious forms of harm.  Yet, it must be 
remembered that it is difficult to plead and prove fraud.  Relevant principles have sometimes 
been so uncharitably construed by courts as to provide no remedy to deliberately deceived 
investors.259  So, too, actions for negligent misrepresentation often offer only a surprisingly 
narrow range of recovery.260  Even deceptive trade practices acts, which were originally intended 
                                                          
259
 See Andrew R. Simank, Deliberately Defrauding Investors: The Scope of Liability, 42 ST. MARY'S L.J. 253, 256 
(2010)  (explaining that the reason-to-expect-reliance standard has been subject to different interpretations by state 
and federal courts and interpreted very narrowly by the Texas Supreme Court). 
260
 See Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 118 (N.Y. 1985) (applying a near-privity 
requirement). 
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to simplify the requirement of parallel common law principles, have been reformed in many 
states in ways that limit their application to harm arising from the provision of legal services.261 
Thus, if the present legal ethics regime falls due to changes in the way law is practiced, it 
is not clear what legal substitute could effectively take its place.  That unanswered challenge will 
need to be addressed with the same energy and dedication with which the current matrix of 
substantive standards and enforcement mechanisms was built, largely from scratch, during the 
past fifty years.262  Presumably, if the challenge could be met once, it can be met again.  In 
another fifty years, the field of American legal ethics may look very different than it does today. 
 
 
                                                          
261
 In Texas, the state deceptive trade practices act does not apply to high-dollar legal representation “ arising from a 
transaction, a project, or a set of transactions relating to the same project, involving total consideration by the 
consumer of more than $500,000 ***.” TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.49(g) (Westlaw 2012). The Texas DTPA also 
does not apply to “a claim for damages based on the rendering of a professional service, the essence of which is the 
providing of advice, judgment, opinion, or similar professional skill,” unless there was “an express 
misrepresentation of a material fact” that cannot be characterized as advice, judgment, or opinion; a failure to 
disclose certain types of information intended to induce a consumer to participate in a transaction; an 
“unconscionable action or course of action that cannot be characterized as advice, judgment, or opinion”; or a 
“breach of an express warranty that cannot be characterized as advice, judgment, or opinion.” Id. at § 17.49(c).  But 
see Amalfitano v. Rosenberg, 572 F.3d 91, 92, 2009 WL 2020624 (2d Cir. 2009) (imposing treble damages 
attempted deception under the New York attorney misconduct statute). 
262
 See Part II. 
